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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
REY DE LA CRUZ LOPEZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040816-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The State's Reply Brief of Appellant responds to the arguments raised in 
defendant's Brief of Appellee. The State relies on its opening Brief of Appellant with 
regard to all other arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE STATE HAS A STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL 
FROM AN ORDER GRANTING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A 
GUILTY PLEA, THE STATE HAS A RIGHT TO APPEAL THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING ITS SUA SPONTE MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW DEFENDANT'S PLEAS 
Defendant claims that the State has no right to appeal the trial court's order in this 
case. See Aple. Br. at 8-10. Specifically, defendant claims that "the state's ability to 
appeal in a criminal case is limited," Aple. Br. at 8, and that the governing statute allows 
for appeal only when the trial court grants a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea, not 
when the court grants its own motion, Aple. Br. at 9-10. Defendant's contention is 
contrary to the plain language of the governing statute. Thus, this Court should reject it. 
"Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l . . . 'delineates a narrow category of cases in which 
the prosecution may take an appeal.'" State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 
1992) (quoting State v. Waddoups, 111 P.2d 223. 224 (Utah 1985)). Because "section 77-
18a-1(2) is restrictive rather than permissive[,]. . the State has no right to appeal except 
as expressly provided therein." State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 n.l (Utah App. 1998). 
"To determine whether an appeal falls within one of the statutorily enumerated grounds, 
[this Court] look[s] to general rules of statutory construction." State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 
1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990). 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25, 4 P.3d 795. "[Statutory 
term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted meaning, 
where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of 
the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, % 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). "'[This Court] interprets] a statute to avoid absurd 
consequences.'" State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, \ 8, 51 P.3d 729 (quoting State v. 
Redd, 1999 UT 108, \ 12, 992 P.2d 986). 
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Subsection 77-18a-l(2)(g) of the Utah Code provides that the prosecutor may 
appeal from "an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(g) (West 2004).1 Defendant contends that this 
provision does not allow the State's appeal in this case because "[t]he statute 
contemplates a trial court's grant of a motion made by a defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea." Aple. Br. at 9. However, nothing in the plain language of subsection (2)(g) limits 
its application only to motions filed by defendant. See Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-l(2)(g). 
Thus, defendant's contention is not supported by the plain language of the statute and 
should be rejected. 
Moreover, defendant provides no rational explanation for why the Legislature 
would limit the State's right to appeal to only those cases where defendant, rather than the 
court, instituted the withdrawal motion. The clear intent of the Legislature in allowing 
the State to appeal grants of motions to withdraw is to protect the finality of criminal 
convictions by providing the State with a mechanism through which to challenge a trial 
court ruling that upsets such convictions. That intent is undermined if the State's right to 
appeal under subsection (2)(g) reaches only rulings on withdrawal motions initiated by 
defendant, not those initiated by the trial court. 
Section 77-18a-l was amended in 2005. See 2005 Utah Laws ch. 106. Those 
cases in which the State has a right to appeal are now defined in subsection (3). 
Subsection (3)(c) now provides that the State may appeal from "an order granting a 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest." Id Because nothing in the 2005 
amendments affect this appeal, the State refers to the statute that was in effect when the 
State filed its notice of appeal. 
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Finally, the State's interest in appealing from an order withdrawing a guilty plea is 
arguably more compelling when a trial court acts sua sponte than when a trial court 
merely grants a defendant's motion because of the potential double jeopardy implications 
of the trial court's sua sponte ruling. See, e.g. State v. Bernert, 2004 UT App 321, | 8 & 
n.l, 100 P.3d 221 (noting that rule in this jurisdiction is that jeopardy attaches once a trial 
court accepts a guilty plea; thus, court's sua sponte withdrawal of plea may preclude 
retrial absent a showing of "manifest necessity"). Thus, this Court should reject an 
interpretation of subsection (2)(g) that limits the State's right to appeal to only those 
orders granting a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Cf McKinnon, 2002 UT App 
214, \ 8 ("'[W]e interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences.'") (quoting Redd, 1999 
UT 108, \ 12); Coonee, 2001 UT App 355, *{ 9 (holding court should avoid statutory 
interpretations that contradict purpose of statute). 
In sum, both the plain language of section 77-18a-l(2)(g) and the intent behind the 
provision indicate that the provision encompasses the trial court's grants of all motions to 
withdraw, not merely those filed by defendants. This Court, therefore, should reject 
defendant's claim that the State had no right to appeal the trial court's grant of its own 
withdrawal motion here.2 
defendant's attempt to avoid this result by referring to the trial court's order as a 
"sua sponte decision to set aside [defendant's] plea" rather than as a decision on the 
court's sua sponte motion to withdraw defendant's plea, see, e.g. Aple. Br. at 10, is 
unavailing. This Court "look[s] to the substance of [the trial court's] ruling and not to 
[t]he label attached . . . by a trial judge" to determine whether the State may appeal the 
ruling under the statute. Larsen, 834 P.2d at 589 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted; last two alterations in original). 
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II. DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
RETAINS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE A 
GUILTY PLEA IS UNTENABLE IN LIGHT OF THE 
JURISDICTIONAL NATURE OF THE PLEA WITHDRAWAL 
STATUTE 
Defendant claims that the trial court had jurisdiction to withdraw defendant's 
guilty pleas after announcement of sentence because it "is clear from the [plea 
withdrawal] statute's plain language that [the statute] only applies to defendants." Aple. 
Br. at 10. "Because the plea statute does not apply to a trial court's decision to set aside a 
guilty plea," defendant continues, "the trial court retained jurisdiction/' even after the 
statutory period had expired, to withdraw defendant's pleas here. Aple. Br. at 10-11, 17. 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court's order setting aside defendant's pleas was 
proper because "[a] trial court has inherent power and authority to govern the criminal 
proceedings it presides over," including to "set the plea aside because it believed, upon 
further reflection, that the plea was not made knowingly." Id. at 18, 25. This Court 
should reject defendant's claims as against the plain language and clear intent of the plea 
withdrawal statute. 
A, Where the clear intent of the plea withdrawal statute is to limit 
the time period during which guilty pleas may be withdrawn, 
this Court should reject defendant's contention that the 
statutory time limitation does not apply to trial courts. 
Defendant claims that it is "clear from the [plea withdrawal] statute's plain 
language that the process set out for withdrawing a guilty plea only applies to 
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defendants." Aple. Br. at 10. This Court should reject defendant's claims as against the 
clear language and intent of the plea withdrawal statute. 
As previously stated, this Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give 
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25, 4 P.3d 795. 
Statutory terms are interpreted "according to [their] usually accepted meaning, where the 
ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." 
State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, f 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). "'[This Court] interprets] a statute to avoid absurd consequences.'" 
State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, \ 8, 51 P.3d 729 (quoting State v. Redd, 1999 UT 
108, f 12, 992 P.2d 986). 
The plea withdrawal statute defines when and how a guilty plea may be 
withdrawn: 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be 
made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may 
not be announced unless the motion is denied.... 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, 
Chapter 35 a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a)-(c) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
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Even if, as defendant suggests, the clear majority of cases involving withdrawal of 
guilty pleas arise out of a defendant's motion to withdraw, see Aple. Br. at 11-13, nothing 
in the plea withdrawal statute limits its application to solely those motions. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6. Indeed, the plain language of subsection (2)(c)—which requires 
that "any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be" brought through a petition for post conviction relief—clearly 
reflects the Legislature's intent to remove from the trial court's jurisdiction all motions to 
withdraw a guilty plea presented after that time period in subsection (2)(b) has expired, 
whether such motions are brought by the defendant or the trial court. See id. § 77-13-
6(2)(c) (emphasis added); cf. State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43, If 11 n. 2, P.3d 
(discussing plea withdrawal statute as being jurisdictional without limiting jurisdictional 
nature to only motions filed by defendants); State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fflf 13-20, 
P.3d (discussing prior cases addressing jurisdictional nature of plea withdrawal 
statute; although sometimes referring to statute as limiting a defendant's right to file 
withdrawal motions, also using more general language equally applicable to trial court 
motions). 
The conclusion that the plea withdrawal statute applies equally to courts as to 
defendants is also consistent with the Legislature's intent in providing a finite time frame 
in which withdrawal motions may be considered. As the supreme court noted in State v. 
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 10, 31 P.3d 528, one purpose of the plea withdrawal statute is to 
"prevent[] lengthy delays before the filing of motions to withdraw." See also Tape 2, 
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Utah Senate Floor Debates, 56 Legis. Gen. Sess. (March 4, 2003) ("The purpose of this 
bill, one of the purposes, is to clarify that a plea must be withdrawn before sentencing is 
announced.") (statement of Sen. Gladwell discussing 2003 amendment amending time 
frame for filing motions to withdraw). Such a purpose is met only if the time limit within 
the withdrawal statute applies equally to all motions. 
Under defendant's interpretation, however, a trial court would never lose 
jurisdiction over a defendant's untimely motion. Rather, a court could re-create 
jurisdiction over a defendant's untimely motion to withdraw merely by adopting the 
untimely motion as its own. Any court, therefore, could easily undermine the puipose of 
the plea withdrawal statute, despite the clear intent of the Legislature to limit the period in 
which a plea may be withdrawn. 
Finally, defendant's contention that the plea withdrawal statute applies only to 
defendants is inconsistent with case law addressing the jurisdictional nature of the statute. 
In 1992, the court of appeals held that the 30-day time limit in section 77-13-6(b)(2) for 
filing motions to withdraw guilty pleas was jurisdictional. See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 
578, 583 (Utah App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^ 
11,31 P.3d 528. In reaching that conclusion, the court likened the 30-day time limit for 
filing motions to withdraw to the 30-day time limits for filing notices of appeal and 
petitions for writ of certiorari under rules 4 and 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Id. at 582. The supreme court made the same comparison in Ostler, noting that "[t]he 
running of the thirty-day limit parallels the running of the thirty-day limit of filing a 
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notice of appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari under rule 4, and rule 48 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure." Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 11 n.3. 
Neither rule 4 nor rule 48 expressly state that their limitations constrain the 
authority of appellate courts to assert jurisdiction outside the time periods provided. See 
Utah R. App. P. 4, 48. Nonetheless, no court has ever suggested that an appellate court 
may exercise jurisdiction over appeals commenced outside those rules' 30-day periods. 
To the contrary, the supreme court has repeatedly held that "[t]his court has no authority 
to extend its jurisdiction beyond the 30-day period for filing notice of appeal plainly 
stated in the rule." State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, \ 5, 57 P.3d 1065 (citing State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981)). The court's only power is to dismiss the appeal. 
Id. (citing Prowswood v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984)); see 
also Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App 312, Tf 6, 78 P.3d 631 ('" When a matter is 
outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the [matter]'") 
(quoting Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)). If, as 
Utah courts have suggested, the jurisdictional nature of the plea withdrawal statute 
parallels that of appellate rules 4 and 48, the same result applies here. 
Neither the plain language of the plea withdrawal statute, nor the legislative 
history, nor case law addressing the jurisdictional nature of the statute supports 
defendant's interpretation of the plea withdrawal statute. To the contrary, all support the 
conclusion that the jurisdictional time limit in the statute applies not only to defendants, 
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but also to the trial courts. Thus, this Court should reject defendant's claim that the 
statute applies only to defendants. 
B. A trial court's general discretion to review interlocutory orders 
so long as a final judgment has not been entered cannot create 
jurisdiction where jurisdiction was never properly invoked. 
Defendant claims that, "[b]ecause the plea [withdrawal] statute does not apply to a 
trial court and the trial court had not entered a final signed judgment, it retained 
jurisdiction to set aside [defendant's] guilty plea." Aple. Br. at 17-18. As already argued, 
however, the plea withdrawal statute does apply to trial courts. See Point II.A. supra. 
Thus, the trial court's jurisdiction to consider withdrawal of defendant's pleas expired 
upon announcement of sentence, and the trial court had no power to exercise jurisdiction 
over a motion where that jurisdiction was never properly invoked. 
"The Utah Constitution gives the district courts subject matter jurisdiction 'in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute.'" Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 
423, Tf 7, 103 P.3d 171 (quoting Utah Const, art. VII, § 5). '"Subject matter jurisdiction is 
the power and authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it 
cannot proceed.'" Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, f 15 n.5, 67 P.3d 1055 (quoting 
Transworld Sys. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990)) (additional citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, "while the trial court [may have] subject matter jurisdiction [over certain 
types of cases], it [does] not have subject matter jurisdiction over [a] specific claim" until 
its jurisdiction is properly invoked. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91,121 (holding that "while 
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the trial court in this case had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce attorney liens,. . . it 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over [this person's] specific claim because [the 
person] had not properly intervened . . . or otherwise presented his claim to the trial 
court"); see also State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1941) ("Although 
the district courts are courts of general jurisdiction there are statutory provisions covering 
the method by which the courts' jurisdiction may be invoked."); Case, 2004 UT App 423, 
U 9 (noting district court has jurisdiction to modify child support orders issued by another 
state only "as long as certain conditions are met") 
If the court's jurisdiction is never properly invoked, "the power of the court to act 
is as absent as if it did not exist." Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Security 
Investment Ltd v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131, \ 13, 47 P.3d 97 (holding that "[failure to 
strictly comply with the filing requirements" under the Governmental Immunity Act 
"deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted), cert denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002). 
In this case, the plea withdrawal statute sets forth the procedure that must be 
followed in order to invoke a trial court's jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2). That procedure requires that withdrawal motions be 
made "before sentence is announced." Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). No such motion was made 
here. Thus, the trial court's jurisdiction to consider withdrawal motions was never 
invoked and lapsed upon announcement of sentence. 
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Given that lapse, defendant's reliance on the lack of a final order, see Aple. Br. at 
16-18, is misplaced. A trial court may not use its traditional powers to review prior 
interlocutory orders "to create jurisdiction where none exists." Boyd v. State, 971 S.W.2d 
603, 605 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that courts cannot use other procedural rules to create 
jurisdiction where such jurisdiction was not properly invoked under the specific rale 
governing such jurisdiction); cf Glauber Valve Company, Inc. v. United States, 536 
F.Supp. 68, 70 ( E.D. Ark. 1982) ("While this Court has broad equitable powers, it cannot 
create jurisdiction in a sui t . . . where no statutory basis exists."). 
Indeed, such a contention is in direct conflict with the intent of the Legislature's 
recent amendment of the plea withdrawal statute's time limitation, which were enacted in 
direct response to the supreme court's decision in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^  10, 31 
P.3d528. 
In Ostler, the supreme court considered whether the 30-day time limit in the plea 
withdrawal statute prior to the 2003 amendment ran from "the time the plea is accepted" 
or "the time of entry of judgment of conviction on the plea." Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 8. In 
rejecting the State's argument that the 30 days ran from acceptance of the plea, 1he court 
noted that, 
as the state argues, a district court could not entertain such a motion, 
even one based on evidence of actual innocence and supported by 
the prosecution, brought before the entry of judgement and 
conviction, but more than thirty days from the taking of the plea. . . 
[I]t make no sense to deprive the district court of the power to re\iew 
a plea before it enters a judgment of conviction and sentence. 
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Id. at ^10. 
In direct response to Ostler, however, the Legislature amended the plea withdrawal 
statute to require that motions be both filed and decided prior to announcement of 
sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003); see also Tape 2, Utah Senate 
Floor Debates, 56 Legis. Gen. Sess. (March 4, 2003) (noting that amendment was "to 
clarify" the time period for withdrawing a plea in light of Ostler). Thus, whether it makes 
sense or not, the Legislature's clear intent was indeed "to deprive the district court of the 
power to review a plea before it enters a judgment of conviction and sentence," where 
such entry of judgment occurs after announcement of sentence. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^ f 10. 
Given this clear intent, defendant's claim that "the trial court retained jurisdiction because 
a final signed order of judgment was never entered," Aple. Br. at 16 (capitalization and 
underlining omitted), is untenable. 
In sum, because the trial court's jurisdiction over motions to withdraw guilty pleas 
was never properly invoked before announcement of sentence, the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to withdraw defendant's pleas after sentence was announced. 
C. The trial court's inherent authority over its proceedings does not 
authorize withdrawal of pleas without proof that the pleas were 
unknowing or involuntary. 
On the assumption that the trial court retained jurisdiction to reconsider 
defendant's pleas, defendant claims that, "[g]iven the trial court's inherent power to 
amend orders to conform with justice and its heavy burden of ensuring [defendant's] 
guilty plea[s] strictly complied with Rule 11 requirements, it was within the trial court's 
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discretion to immediately set the plea[s] aside because it believed, upon further reflection, 
that the plea[s] [were] not made knowingly." Aplt. Br. at 25. 
However, as argued in the State's Brief of Appellant, see Aplt. Br. at 10-16, even 
if the trial court did have jurisdiction to set aside defendant's pleas here, the court 
nonetheless abused its discretion in doing so where the court's ruling was "based purely 
on 'unsupported generalizations and speculation.'" In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 835 & 
n.4 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the arguments presented in the State's Brief of 
Appellant, the State asks this Court to vacate the trial court's order setting aside 
defendant's guilty pleas and to order the trial court to enter a final judgment consistent 
with those pleas and the sentences announced by the court immediately after their 
acceptance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Jj_ July 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNJK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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